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1 INTRODUCTION 
The history of the South African labour movement has been one of a strug-
gle to limit the power of both business and government to act autono-
mously. Since 1990 the labour movement has increasingly become involved 
in processes of multipartite policy formulation as it attempts to ensure that 
state policy does not compromise the interests of working people. The 
National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) is the key 
statutory body which institutionalises this mode of policy-making. 
This article is about labour's role in the processes of policy formulation 
that occur under the auspices of NEDLAC. Our specific concern is to assess 
the gains that labour has made from its participation in NEDLAC as well as 
to analyse the difficulties experienced by labour in its engagement with 
the NEDLAC process. The article is divided into five sections. Firstly we 
will discuss the formation of NEDLAC and its structure. The article will 
then go on to identify the aggregate gains that accrue to society as a whole 
because of NEDLAC, before proceeding to discuss the gains that labour 
has made from NEDLAC. The fourth section of the article analyses the 
difficulties experienced by labour in NEDLAC and the implications of these 
problems for their effective participation. The final section will draw some 
conclusions about labour's involvement in NEDLAC. 
2 THE FORMATION OF NEDLAC 
At the time of South Africa's transition to political democracy, not only did 
the South African trade union movement have a high degree of numerical 
strength but it was able to wield this power strategically to make signifi-
cant inroads into the power of the apartheid state (Adler and Webster, 
1995). By 1994 union density in South Africa stood at 49.83 % (Macun, 
1997). Whilst this union membership is dispersed across eight federations, 
67 % of membership is concentrated within three federations: COSATU. 
NACTU, and FEDSAL. 1 These three federations make up the labour group-
ing represented in NEDLAC. 
1 Since the research was conducted FEDSAL amalgamated with two other union bodies 
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During the late 1 980s and early 1 990s COSATU's and NACTU's strategic 
use of power was to result in the restructuring and transformation of the 
National Manpower Commission [NMC] and the establishment of the 
National Economic Forum (NEF). The NMC and NEF would become the 
forerunners of NEDLAC. 
The NMC was restructured from a "toothless advisory body" (Baskin, 
1996: 30) into a tripartite negotiating body, which compelled the state to 
consult before changing labour legislation. The NEF resulted from conflict 
over the introduction of the new Value Added Tax system in 1991. The 
NEF represented an attempt to parallel the political negotiation process 
within CODESA by compelling the apartheid state to negotiate on eco-
nomic restructuring and policy direction. 
The changes in the NMC and the creation of the N EF were testimony to 
both the strength and strategic capabilities of the South African labour 
movement. However, labour's performance inside these institutions was 
by no means an unequivocal success. A number of labour analysts and 
labour negotiators have identified problems with the unions' engagement 
in these structures. (see for instance: Friedman and Shaw, forthcoming; 
Adler and Webster, 1995). 
In the first instance, whilst unions were able to put issues onto the 
agenda, they lacked the technical capabilities to impact significantly on 
the outcomes of those negotiations. In addition there was a loss of internal 
union democracy and consequently negotiating pOSitions were very rarely 
mandated, nor did they always reach the union's membership. The con-
clusion some analysts draw was that the NEF, in particular, did not deliver 
much in the way of significant outcomes. However, the primary concern 
of the NEF was to prevent unilateral restructuring by an illegitimate gov-
ernment and not to formulate new policies. As Christian Sellars of the 
Chemical Workers' Industrial Union argued, "The National Economic 
Forum did not accomplish much, but then its purpose was to block unilat-
eral reform by the National Party, rather than to develop new policy". This 
was in sharp contrast to the central objective of NEDLAC which is actively 
to consider and to influence policy through consensual agreements on 
social and economic matters before they are tabled in parliament. 
Notwithstanding this primary objective, Friedman and Shaw have ar-
gued that the process of blocking government restructuring within the 
NEF "inhibited the unions' attempt to pursue an alternative social policy 
agenda", thus reducing them to adopting a reactive role within tripartite 
institutions (ibid: 349). 
The history of labour's engagement in tripartite structures is thus 
somewhat mixed. On the one hand, labour had the political power to 
prevent the unilateral restructuring of policy, yet on the other lacked the 
capacity and the internal communication structures fully to deal with 
engagement in these forums. This history is further complicated by the 
experience of tripartite structures as mechanisms for blocking govern-
ment initiatives rather than actively shaping policy. 
In February 1995 the NMC and the NEF were integrated into NEDLAC 
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and extended the powers of the NEF and NMC although it was substan-
tially different from these institutions (Baskin, 1996: 30). 
Perhaps self-evidently, the fact that NEDLAC is a statutory body means 
that it has substantially more power and stability than the tripartite consul-
tative forums that existed before or which exist elsewhere in the world. 
The NEDLAC Act recognises four groups as being eligible for membership 
of NEDLAC. These are representatives of organised business (at present 
business is represented by Business South Africa (BSA) and the National 
African Federated Chambers of Commerce (NAFCOC»; representatives of 
organised labour comprising COSATU, FEDSAL, and NACTU; representa-
tives of community and development organisations; and representatives 
of government. 
The Act establishes the objectives of NEDLAC as well as delineating its 
structure. According to section 5(1) of the Act the Council shaH -
"strive to promote the goals of economic growth. participatiOn in economic 
decision-making and social eqUity; 
seek to reach consensus and conclude agreements on matters pertaining to 
economic and social policy; 
consider all proposed labour legislatiOn relating to labour market policy before 
it is introduced in Parliament; 
consider all significant changes to social and economic policy before it is im-
plemented or introduced in Parliament; 
encourage and promote the formulation of co-ordinated policy on social and 
economic matters," 
The provision of the Act for consultation on all proposed labour legislation 
and SOCial and economic policy provides considerable formal space for 
labour to shape government policy as well as placing strong limits on the 
policy areas in which government has autonomy. As Adler and Webster 
point out, "although parliament is sovereign and NEDLAC is an advisory 
body, a potential consensus between the social partners would be difficult 
for parliamentarians to disregard" (Adler and Webster, 1996: 16). 
However, the extent to which the space that the Act provides is realised 
is contingent on the power relations between the social partners and the 
ability of labour to contest the policy process within NEDLAC, thereby 
shaping the outcomes of the NEDLAC process. 
The question that this article tries to answer is twofold: to what extent 
has labour managed to use that legislative space to win real gains for its 
membership, either through influencing the content of policy proposals 
and outcomes or through blocking undesirable policy proposals? Secondly, 
what are the reasons for its success or lack of it in using this space? 
3 THE STRUCTURE OF NEDLAC 
3.1 Constitutional structures 
To achieve its objectives, the NEDLAC Act makes provIsIon for three 
structures. The Executive Council is the most senior structure. It receives 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &DEVELOPME.NT . 
then taken through the parliamentary process. The Management Commit-
tee is in charge of co-ordinating the work of the chambers (NEDLAC. 
1996: iii). The Chambers are the formal negotiating structures of NEDLAC. 
There are a total of four chambers each dealing with a different policy 
area. The Trade and Industry Chamber deals with issues related to the 
"economic and social dimensions of trade. industrial, mining, agricultural 
and services policies and the associated institutions of delivery". The 
Development Chamber's area of focus is "all matters pertaining to devel-
opment both urban and rural implementation strategies, financing of 
development programmes. campaigns to mobilise the nation behind the 
RDP, and associated institutions of delivery". The Labour Market Chamber 
deals with all issues "pertaining to the world of work and the associated 
institutions of delivery". Finally. the brief of the Public Finance and Mone-
tary Policy Chamber is to reach agreement on all issues "pertaining to the 
framework within which financial, fiscal. monetary and exchange-rate 
policies are formulated: the co-ordination of fiscal and monetary policy, 
and related elements of macroeconomic pOlicy; and the associated insti-
tutions of delivery" (NEDLAC 1996: 12-24). 
As the Chambers are constitutional NEDLAC structures, they operate 
according to a set of formal procedures which include the taping of debate 
and the tabling and endorsement of minutes from previous meetings 
(interviews: Kettledas. Botha and Du Plessis). Adrian du Plessis. BSA 
negotiator in the Labour Market Chamber. notes that the formalism of the 
chambers sometimes constrains the process of negotiations: 
"Especially in the chambers where you sit there with a tape recorder and there 
are minutes. people are going to argue about whether they said 'shaIl' or 
'may'" (interview: Botha and Du Plessis). 
Les Kettledas, Deputy Director-General of the Department of Labour. makes 
a similar point when he notes that "(i)n the chamber you go on record and 
people may not want to bind themselves" (interview: Kettledas). Thus the 
formal nature of chamber meetings means that people are, at times, 
reluctant to engage in hard negotiation lest they find themselves bound to 
a position that may have shifted between chamber meetings. 
3.2 Extra-constitutional structures 
In an attempt to "achieve the spirit of NEDLAC rather than the letter" a 
number of extra-constitutional bodies now exist within the NEDLAC 
process (interview: Botha and Du Plessis). The most senior of these bodies 
is the Committee of Principals. which was established during negotiations 
over the new Labour Relations Act to explore ways to further the negotia-
tion process (interview: Kettledas). These meetings are attended by the 
overall conveners of the social partners as well as by the senior negotia-
tors in any particular issue. As this is not a constitutional NEDLAC struc-
ture, discussions are informal and are aimed at facilitating the process of 
negotiation rather than at concluding agreements. 
The second type of extra-constitutional structures are the conveners 
meetings, which take place both at a management committee level and at 
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meetings are attended by the conveners of each of the social partners in 
the chamber or management committee. Their function is to set the 
agenda for the chamber by deciding which issues should be placed on the 
agenda. In addition they prioritise issues for discussion within the particu-
lar structure that they convene (interview: Lekwane). In short, they give a 
strategic focus to the workload that faces NEDLAC and each of the indi-
vidual chambers. 
The final type of extra-constitutional structures are the working groups 
or negotiations committees. These structures are set up by the social 
partners in the chamber and report to the chamber. Aubrey Lekwane, 
convener of the Development Chamber, notes that "(m)ost of the cham-
ber's work would be dealt with in sub-committees. The chamber acts as a 
ratifying body for the sub-committees" (interview: Lekwane). Kettledas 
elaborates on the role on the negotiations committees: 
"It has always been felt that you cannot negotiate in a full chamber, so we set 
up sub-committees which then allow the partners to bring in specific expertise 
on issues. You must distinguish between the negotiation committees and the 
chamber. The negotiation committee is about a process of negotiation, it al-
lows for a process of exploring settlement" (interview: Kettledas). 
Thus the working groups fulfill a dual purpose. In the first instance they 
allow the social partners the opportunity to bring in expertise on a specific 
issue, competencies that their chamber delegates may not have. Secondly, 
they allow negotiators to explore various options for settlement without 
the concern of being bound to a position that was a tentative offer aimed 
at facilitating the reaching of agreement and not a final offer. 
Whilst the extra-constitutional structures represent an innovative response to 
the challenges of multi·partite policy formulation. they also hold the potential 
for undermining the structure of NED LAC as agreements get shaped in the 
crevices of the organisation and the constitutional structures become no more 
than rubber-stamps for less than transparenr negotiations. 
Notwithstanding the dangers that the extra-constitutional structures hold. 
they are indicative of a vigorous and growing institution. What is neces-
sary is that growth be channeled and consolidated so that the lines of 
authority and responsibility between the different structures are clear. This 
multipliCity of structures creates the potential for a multi-layered negotia-
tion process in which an agreement is being shaped at numerous levels 
within NEDLAC, In turn this means that labour's internal mechanisms need 
to be functioning well to ensure that all its negotiators are fully appraised 
of the state of negotiations in various NEDLAC structures. 
3.3 Placing issues on the agenda 
NEDLAC's agenda is drawn principally from the legislative programme of 
government although, as Sellars points out, there are some important 
exceptions to this. In order for an issue to pass through all the structures. 
it first needs to be tabled for discussion by one of the social partners 
(interview: Sellars). Issues cannot, as Jayendra Naidoo points out, come 
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When NEDLAC was created, an issue of concern could be tabled by any 
of the social partners at any level within the Council (interview: Bethle-
hem). However, this approach resulted in some of the chambers becom-
ing reactive to debates in the public realm instead of focusing on meeting 
goals established by a strategic agenda. This was particularly the case in 
the Public Finance and Monetary Policy Chamber during 1996, where 
discussions were largely driven by debates in the press or the tabling of 
items from the Finance Ministry (interview: Wolmarans). Whilst this was 
advantageous for the labour movement in terms of obtaining access to 
information, many of these issues were not up for negotiation so that very 
few agreements were reached in that chamber. 
The management committee and the conveners' meetings of each 
chamber now playa greater role in determining the agenda for the cham-
ber as well as prioritising issues on that agenda. A central concern behind 
this strategic focusing of the agenda is to ensure that the work of the 
chambers becomes more results-oriented and therefore more able to 
influence the policy process. 
3.4 Labour's representation in NEDLAC 
As noted above, the NEDLAC Labour Caucus is comprised of three federa-
tions: COSATU; FEDSAL and NACTU. Each of the federations has repre-
sentatives on all of NEDLAC's constitutional structures, the exception 
being the convener's meetings that are attended by the convener of the 
labour caucus who in all cases is a COSATU representative (by virtue of 
the federation's greater size). The number of representatives that each 
federation has in each NEDLAC structure is determined by a 4: 1: 1 ratio, in 
proportion to the respective organisation's membership. 
In dealing with the demands of NEDLAC, NACTU and FEDSAL have in-
ternal NEDLAC-specific structures that develop the positions on issues 
related to NEDLAC. NACTU has a NEDLAC Caucus that meets on a fort-
nightly basis and together with the central committee forms the mandat-
ing structure for NACTU in NEDLAC (interview: Ngcukana). FEDSAL has a 
total of five NEDLAC Caucus meetings a year, which together with the 
FEDSAL executive develop the organisation's mandates for NEDLAC 
(interview: Van der Merwe). COSATU does not have a formal structure 
that is dedicated to the consideration of solely NEDLAC issues. Instead, its 
Executive Committee acts as the mandating structure for COSATU's posi-
tion in the labour caucus (interview: Nhlapo). 
The positions of the three federations then have to be amalgamated into 
the pOSition of the NEDLAC Labour Caucus. This is done through three 
structures: a biannual Negotiation School; a quarterly Labour Caucus 
meeting and Labour Caucus meetings before each NEDLAC chamber 
meeting. The first Negotiation School was held in early 1995 to discuss the 
strategies which labour would adopt and the objectives which labour 
hoped to meet in NEDLAC. The school developed a detailed programme of 
caucuses and seminars to build capacity and to ensure that representa-
tives were properly coordinated and accountable (interview: Sellars). The 
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negotiators. During 1996 a NEDLAC Labour Co-ordinating Office was 
established to co-ordinate report backs from negotiators as well as to 
ensure negotiators' presence at NED LAC meetings. The successes and 
weaknesses of these structures will be discussed below. 
4 LABOUR'S PARTICIPATION IN NED LAC 
In analysing labour's role in NEDLAC we need to differentiate between the 
outcomes of the institution and the process through which those outcomes 
are realised. The former provides us with an indication of the extent to 
which labour has realised its goals in NEDLAC. An assessment of the latter 
provides us with an understanding of the extent to which outcomes posi-
tive to labour will be sustained. 
4.1 The outcomes 
4.1 ,1 Expanding influence 
The NEDLAC Act provides broad ranging rights of consultation on pro-
posed government legislation and policy and in so doing provides labour 
with considerable access to the ways in which policy is formulated. As 
such one of the most clearly identifiable outcomes of NEDLAC is access 
for labour into the policy-making process. 
As Cunningham Ngcukana, General Secretary of NACTU and labour rep-
resentative on the NEDLAC Management Committee, notes, "NEDLAC is a 
line to put an alternative vision into government" (interview: Ngcukana). 
Lucky Monnokgotla, General Secretary of BIFAWU and labour representa-
tive on the Public Finance and Monetary Chamber, makes a similar point, 
"NEDLAC is good for labour in the sense that we are able to participate. 
We can have our views heard around issues that affect our class" (inter-
view: Monnokgotla). 
Of particular importance is the fact that this is a right entrenched in 
legislation, therefore labour already has a guaranteed voice in the policy 
making process. As such labour need only mobilise in those instances in 
which negotiations deadlock, as it no longer has to expend considerable 
resources on getting a place at the table. In some instances, labour has 
used NEDLAC to put in place structures and processes that expand their 
area of influence over government policy and actions. The most sig-
nificant of these is the Technical Sectoral Liaison Committee which was 
established as a result of labour's insistence that its views be taken into 
account in the conclusion of trade agreements. This committee provides a 
forum in which government officials consult the social partners on trade 
negotiations, thereby providing labour the opportunity to shape trade 
negotiations. 
Other victories have included gaining representation on the government 
contingents to UNCT AD IX and the ministerial meeting of the World Trade 
Organisation (interview: Ramburuth). Thus NEDLAC provides labour with 
the legislative right to influence the policy process and therefore the sorts 
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by Jayendra Naidoo, executive director of NEDLAC, when he says that 
"NEDLAC has given labour a far bigger bite than any other system (in the 
world). From a union point of view it is a much desired outcome" 
4.1.2 New legislation 
The labour movement has managed to use the space provided by 
NEDLAC to intervene successfully in the area of labour legislation. This has 
resulted in the Labour Market Chamber being the site of slow, painstaking, 
but ultimately conclusive negotiations. Obviously a key victory for labour 
in this chamber was the new Labour Relations Act. Aspects of the Act 
which were the specific result of labour's intervention were the entrench-
ment of organisational rights, the facilitation of participation in industry 
restructuring and the right to the disclosure of information (interview: 
Kettledas). 
4.1.3 Power on the streets 
The LRA negotiations constitute a good example of how labour has both 
utilised the space within NEDLAC to influence the policy process as well as 
employed power to ensure that its interests are represented. Labour has 
maintained its capaCity to mobilise to break deadlocks on issues of impor-
tance to its membership. This dual process of engagement inside the 
institution and mobilisation on the streets is a continuation of COSATU's 
strategiC involvement in struggle over the last ten years. The ability of the 
movement to translate mass power into an institutional VOice both on the 
factory floor and in policy arena has been the hallmark of the South 
African labour movement, and continues to be of importance in ensuring 
that labour's interests are clearly represented in NEDLAC outcomes. 
Jayendra Naidoo noted that "labour has successfully retained the right of 
action" (interview: Naidoo). 
4.1.4 Shaping international relations 
The labour caucus also succeeded in putting human rights on South Af-
rica's trade agenda, in the form of a side-letter on human rights. Whilst 
labour had to retreat from its initial position of a strict link between mar-
ket access and a country's ratification of the core lLO conventions, it 
nonetheless compelled the government to concede a Side-letter. which 
requires those countries with which South Africa has trade agreements to 
sign a non-binding agreement to respect human rights and to work to-
wards the ratification of core lLO conventions (Gostner, 1997). The social 
clause framework agreement is also a symbolic victory as it has shifted 
the dominant vision of trade from one in which trade is represented as a 
purely economic phenomenon to one in which trade is seen to have a 
social dimension (ibid). In so doing. the social clause process has enabled 
labour to challenge the ideological terrain in which the policy process is 
embedded, thereby opening space for the insertion of a greater social 
orientation into the policy process. 
The partial victory of the social clause also set other processes in motion 
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to compel the government to sign the Social Clause Framework Agree-
ment, the government has had to embark on the ratification of core ILO 
conventions (Rosenthal and Gostner, 1996). Thus, through NEDLAC, la-
bour has not only been able to win concessions from government to 
improve the domestic context in which it operates, but it has also been 
able to set in place a number of mechanisms and processes through which 
they can attempt to influence the polices adopted by international bodies. 
4.1.5 Shaping government policy 
Labour has also managed to win a commitment from government that the 
reduction of the budget deficit will not take place at the expense of social 
expenditure (interview: Monnokgotla). This commitment was ratified in 
the 1997-1998 Budget, where social spending as a percentage of GDP 
remained constant, whilst total social spending increased by R8 billion 
(Business Day: 8). Joshua Wolmarans, convener of the NEDLAC Public 
Finance and Monetary Chamber, acknowledged labour's ability to shape 
policy: 
"I can definitely say that if they (labour) hadn't been there the discusslOns 
would have gone in a very different direction. Government and business are 
often just concerned with the pure economic issues, whereas labour has a so· 
cial focus. So labour definitely brings more of a social dimension to the cham-
ber's discussions" (interview: Woimarans). 
The above are just a few of the legislative and policy gains that labour has 
made through NEDLAC. However, what this review of some of labour's 
gains through NEDLAC has demonstrated are the ways in which labour 
has been able optimally to utilise its existing power base and history of 
mobilisation in combination with the rights that are entrenched through 
the NED LAC Act to further an agenda that is favourable to their interests. 
4.2 Problems and challenges for labour 
4.2.1 If atfirst you don't succeed 
Labour has also successfully used NEDLAC as a way of a getting "a second 
bite at the cherry". Perhaps the clearest example of this are the negotia-
tions surrounding the Compensation for Occupational Injury and Diseases 
Act (COIDA). COIDA was initially negotiated through the multipartite Com-
pensation Board and then was passed on to NEDLAC for what was meant 
to be a formal process of ratification (confidential interviews with govern-
ment and labour sources). 
However, labour felt that its interests had not been adequately repre-
sented in the Compensation Board outcome and used NEDLAC as a forum 
for renegotiating aspects of COIDA. 
Yet, whilst this strategy has been a relatively successful one for labour, 
it does pose questions about the status of other stakeholder bodies vis a 
vis NEDLAC. Using NEDLAC in this fashion holds the possibility of under-
mining the work of other forums as well as creating a duplication of 
activities and a slowing down of the decision making process. In addition 
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policy process in which labour avails itself of any opportunity to "renego-
tiate" a prior agreement. Whilst such an approach does provide "a second 
bite at the cherry", labour runs the risk of being criticised for slowing 
down government's delivery and undermining the integrity of agreements 
forged in tripartite fora. As such it would seem imperative that the nature 
of the relationship between different tripartite structures be clarified. It 
would be ideal if the substance of the negotiations could take place in 
what Jayendra Naidoo calls "preliminary bases" so that final agreement in 
NEDLAC becomes a formality (interview: Naidoo). 
4.2.2 Labour and the alliance 
Despite the successes of NEDLAC COSATU has, on occasion, chosen to 
pursue certain issues through its alliance with the African National Con-
gress and South African Communist Party. This decision has been a tacti-
cal move generally with the intention of trying to minimise business' 
influence over the negotiation process. Vusi Nhlapo elaborates: 
"One very obvious example was the restructuring of state assets. In this in-
stance we felt that business should not be involved as they would want to buy 
up the sold-off state assets. It is those issues where labour feels that if business 
had an equal say we will be perpetuating problems of the apartheid era - the 
underdevelopment of workers, structural unemployment - forever. So if busi-
ness would gain an advantage that they wouldn't otherwise have, those issues 
can't go to NEDLAC. NEDLAC and the alliance are not mutually exclUSive. La-
bour knows very well what to take to NEDLAC and what to take to the alliance" 
(interview: Nhlapo). 
Thus the Alliance. for COSATU. does not replace NEDLAC; instead the two 
operate in tandem. on occasion giving labour a double opportunity to 
shape the outcome of policy. Also the use of the Alliance needs to be 
balanced with the fact that it does not offer the same degree of structured 
and formally guaranteed influence that NEDLAC does. In particular, it is 
not possible to make detailed agreements at the Alliance level. Rather it is 
a platform for acceptance or adoption of broad principle. More impor-
tantly. the Alliance is a more complicated forum than NEDLAC from a 
labour point of view because of the myriad of different interests repre-
sented there (interview: Naidoo). The Alliance is a supplementary process 
to NEDLAC, but because of its loosely structured nature and, more impor-
tantly, the fact that it does not give labour any legislatively guaranteed 
rights, it is unlikely to replace NEDLAC as the primary focus of struggle 
over policy. 
Notwithstanding the benefits that using the Alliance provides to COSATU, 
some commentators have remarked that a preference for the "alliance 
route" is reflective of a lack of commitment from labour leadership to 
NEDLAC. Such a perception is strengthened by the fact in September I 
October 1997, when the institution was under attack from critics, there 
was not clear public suppOrt for NEDLAC from labour. That said. at the 
second annual NEDLAC Summit John Gomomo, President of COSATU, 
made the following comment, "We remain committed to NEDLAC and 
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Whilst the possibility of lobbying its alliance partners does strengthen 
COSATU's position it also serves to diminish the status of NEDLAC. It 
would seem that the federation needs to evaluate the relative merits of 
these two routes and decide to back one or the other. Vacillating between 
the two serves both to stretch resources and to dissipate strategic focus. 
4.2,3 "Non-negotiables" 
Although labour has managed to exert influence within NEDLAC and thus 
shape a number of the pollcies and laws adopted by government, labour 
has had progressively less influence over the shaping of macro-economic 
policy. This is perturbing, given the centrality of this area for future legis-
lative and policy developments. In particular, the Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy articulates a doctrine of economic 
rationalism in a global context which considerably constrains the policy 
options which are seen as feasible. 
As one respondent put it, "GEAR is now the orienting framework for 
NEDLAC, for the country, for all of us" (confidential interview: NEDLAC 
source). The effect of the non-negotiable nature of the GEAR policy has 
been most stark in the Public Finance and Monetary Policy Chamber. One 
participant in the chamber argued that: 
"The whole GEAR thing meant that the chamber had to redefine what it was 
doing as it couldn't talk about the big issue ... this has resulted in a strange 
whittling away of issues to try and reach something that we could discuss con-
structively within the chamber." 
Thus, while labour has been generally able to exercise a fair degree of 
influence in NED LAC, the fact that they have been unable to contest GEAR 
may have negative implications for the extent to which they are able to 
impact on policy in the future. 
That said, NEDLAC is a product of labour's struggle to limit government's 
power unilaterally to introduce policy. Accordingly it will remain an impor-
tant site in which to contest the implementation of some of the more 
conservative elements of GEAR. As Vusi Nhlapo put it, "NEDLAC plays a 
critical role in ensuring that government does not have unfettered power, 
so it is a necessary thing" (interview: Nhlapo). 
4.2.4 Lost opportunities 
The above discussion has established that labour has made considerable 
gains through NEDLAC both in terms of a scorecard and in terms of 
processes. Labour has been able to make a significant impact on a num-
ber of key legislative mechanisms and policy developments as well as to 
increase their access to the policy making process. However these suc-
cesses have been compromised by a variety of problems which have 
limited labour's ability to effectively use all the space that it has won for 
itself. Accordingly, a number of actors in NEDLAC have argued that labour 
has been unable to use NEDLAC optimally. One trade unionist close to 
labour's caucus in NED LAC asserted that: 
"these are real opportunities; the fact that labour isn't taking them up is a dif-
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we aren't taking up. We've been knocking at the door for all these years, now 
it is open and there is a feeling that we can't go through" (cited in Gostner. 
1997: 134). 
It is to identifying those problems and the ways in which they have af-
fected labour's participation in NEDLAC that the discussion now turns. 
By virtue of its broad focus - according to the Act "all significant changes 
to economic and social policy" - NEDLAC poses unique challenges for 
each of the social partners. As Les Kettledas notes, "there are capacity 
problems in business, there are capaCity problems in government, there 
are capaCity problems in labour" (interview: Kettledas). The problems of 
capacity relate both to the amount of meetings generated by the NEDLAC 
process as well as the complexity of issues, many of which the labour 
movement had not needed to engage with until the formation of NEDLAC. 
Martin Nicol, formerly labour'S representative on the Trade and Indus-
try Chamber, estimated that NEDLAC took up approximately 20% of his 
time. Likewise, Dannhauser van der Merwe, General Secretary of FEDSAL 
and labour representative on the Management Committee, estimated that 
if he attended all NEDLAC-related meetings he would have to attend 48 
meetings a year (interview: Van der Merwe). This workload is then added 
onto the unionists' normal responsibilities, with the result that they are 
often unable to attend all NEDLAC-related meetings. These time commit-
ments don't affect labour only. Business South Africa argues that their 
representatives spend up to 40 % of their time in N EDLAC work and added 
that this was all voluntary (interview: Botha and Du Plessis). 
Perhaps the most striking example of the implications of labour'S inabil-
ity to attend all meetings was around UNCTAD IX in April 1996. As noted 
above, labour had managed to obtain access to the conference by inclu-
sion in government's team. However, labour leadership was simultane-
ously involved in organising a stayaway to protest the attempt by business 
to include the right to lockout in the Constitution. Despite the fact that 
labour had access to UNCTAD IX to lobby developing countries to support 
their position on the social clause, they failed to attend any of the meet-
ings! (interview: Ramburuth). 
Labour has thus been able to use NEDLAC to increase the space avail-
able to it to influence policy, however it has not always had sufficient 
capacity to use the opportunities that it has created. As a result labour has 
not always been able to influence the formulation of policy to the extent 
that is possible. 
The second area of the capacity problem relates to the technical exper-
tise and negotiating ability necessary to deal with the issues that are on 
NED LACs agenda. Although, as discussed above, labour has added a 
social dimension to the discussions in the Public Finance and Monetary 
Policy Chamber. they have been unable to make significant inroads 
(interviews: Labour and Nedlac sources). This is due both to the relative 
distance of these issues from the usual concerns of labour as well the lack 
of skills within labour to deal with these issues. One of our respondents 
contended that "on tax COSATU has been making a lot of noise for some 
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clear package" (confidential interview: Labour source). This observation is 
affirmed by the comments of Monnokgotla, one of labour's representa-
tives in the Public Finance and Monetary Chamber: 
"On income tax and the restructuring of tax. initially labour didn't have a very 
coherent policy position on tax. The Social Equity document is one attempt to 
address that. But we have lost battles, for instance there is now a tax on pen-
sion benefits which we were unable to stop" (interview: Monnakgotla). 
Thus labour's lack of capacity and skills has. in some instances, limited the 
impact it has been able to have on some of the policies that have passed 
through NEDLAC. However, some of labour's representatives have im-
proved their knowledge of the issues over time and are thus able to en-
gage constructively in debates and shape the outcome of the policy 
process. Whilst this is an important step forward, the knowledge base is 
restricted to a few key individuals and, should they leave. labour would 
suffer a severe blow to its capacity to engage in the policy process. As a 
confidential respondent linked to the NEDLAC Labour Caucus argues. 
"there is a failure to build the capacity of negotiators so the knowledge. 
the information remains very secure in that small group of people". 
4.2.5 Government in the driving seat? 
This combination of too many meetings to attend with not enough skills to 
deal with all the issues has resulted in labour "being more reactive than 
proactive" (interview: Monnokgotla). Where labour has put policy propo-
sals on the table - a few noteworthy instances include the social clause, 
the Labour Relations Act and the social plan they have managed to 
influence the outcome of the process substantially. 
To a large extent, however. it is government's legislative programme 
that drives the NEDLAC agenda. The consequence is that government. 
notwithstanding the provisions of the Act. has considerable power over 
what comes to NEDLAC. This is witnessed in the Labour Market Chamber 
where "the Department of Labour's five-year plan drives the work pro-
gramme of the chamber" (confidential interview: BUsiness source). The 
Public Finance and Monetary Policy Chamber experiences similar con-
straints, "Government does not directly define what is discussed in the 
chamber, what it does is define what can't be discussed in the chamber" 
(confidential interview). 
Although it is largely government's agenda driving NEDLAC. labour has 
developed an independent approach to the formulation of policy which is 
articulated in the Labour Caucus's Social Equity document. Yet despite this 
document the experience of NEDLAC would seem to suggest that. with the 
exception of a few cases, the policy framework is largely government's 
while labour has had influence over the details. 
Because government is largely setting the agenda. the potential for la-
bour to define an alternative approach to policy making has been signifi-
cantly constrained. For this reason it is critical that labour develop the cap-
acity to take a more proactive approach in contesting the policy arena. for 
in doing so they will be able to shape the framework within which discus-
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that challenge dominant government thinking. The formation in 1996 of 
the NEDLAC Labour Co-ordinating Office, and its subsequent strengthen-
ing by the appointment of an experienced unionist from SACTWU, holds 
great promise for providing a nucleus around which a proactive labour 
caucus can grow. 
4.2.6 Dysfunctional structures 
The lack of person power has also had a significant impact on the extent 
to which the three federations are able to caucus and get mandates. 
Whilst, as discussed above, there are very clear structures for mandating. 
it is not at all clear that they are operating effectively. One respondent 
argued that "structures are dysfunctional, no-one can say that there is 
even a semblance of functionality" (confidential interview: Labour source). 
The failure of structures to function effectively is also identified by Dann-
hauser van der Merwe, who says: 
"We are meant to meet for a labour caucus before each chamber meeting and 
each Management Committee meeting, but in reality we only managed be-
tween 10% and 20 % of the time for the Chambers and between 30 % and 
40 % for the Management Committee" (interview: Van der Merwe), 
Dysfunctional structures pose a serious threat to labour's engagement in 
NEDLAC. This is especially true in the context of a plethora of constitu-
tional and extra-constitutional structures within NEDLAC, all of which 
impact on the negotiations process. It was noted above that if labour did 
not have clear and functional structures, the multiplicity of structures 
could undermine the extent to which the union's negotiating position is 
reflective of a broad consensus; and, instead. the NEDLAC Labour Caucus 
pOSition runs the risk of being reduced to one or two people in a side-
meeting, Thus the apparent lack of functional structures results in situa-
tions in which even the labour representatives within NEDLAC are not 
sure of exactly how and where deals get brokered. Marrin Nicol, labour's 
negotiator in the Trade and Industry Chamber, noted this problem in 
relation to the social clause process: 
"Look, when you go into negotiations you expect to go backwards, the problem 
is that we don't know how it happened" (cited in Gostner 1997: 138). 
4.2.7 Loose mandates but tight leadership 
A second consequence of the failure of structures to operate consistently is 
that "in practice our (labour's) mandate is very loose, mainly because the 
NEDLAC Labour Caucus doesn't meet more often" (confidential interview: 
Labour source). Another said: "mandating is often a process that is con-
trolled by a very few individuals, about three to five depending on the 
issue" (confidential interview: Labour source), Tony Ehrenreich of NUMSA 
makes a similar point: 
"Most of the time as labour we hold a caucus meeting before each NEDLAC 
meeting and that is informed by the prinCiples underpinning the Social EqUity 
document. (But) because there are so many things on the go at NED LAC, there 
is not enough time to always go back for a mandate, so you operate within 
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However, the problem of mandating does not only exist between the 
federations. but also exists within each federation, as the links between 
the federation and each of the affiliates are not clear, As Enoch Godong-
wana, General Secretary of NUMSA put it: 
"Most of these decisions take place at the level of senior negotiators and then it 
goes to COSATU EXCO (Executive Committee) to be mandated, The capacity of 
the affiliates to absorb all that is churned out of NEDLAC is very limited. I don't 
want to try and give thiS a semblance of democracy, most of the discussion is 
at an executive level. This is not an intentional thing. but it has to be that way 
in order to be expedient" (cited in Gostner, 1997: 138-139). 
Where there are no specific mandates, labour can always fall back on con-
gress resolutions, such as occurred during the employment standards 
negotiations. Operating within broad policy directives agreed at union 
congresses is not problematic in and of itself as these do constitute a 
mandated position. However, NEDLAC negotiations are often in areas that 
are not addressed at congresses and as such there needs to be regular 
meetings of the structures that provide for the formulation of mandates 
and policy positions within NEDLAC. 
The fact that mandating does not seem to happen in any consistent or 
coherent way is borne out by the experience of negotiations within 
NEDLAC, where agreements reached at one level are overturned by 
leadership at the level of the management committee (confidential inter-
view: Labour source). In some instances, such as the social clause process, 
it would seem as if the decision to reject decisions rests in the hands of the 
labour caucus convenor! (Gostner, 1997). As one labour negotiator noted 
in a confidential interview: 
"Look you need to understand something about NEDLAC. The leadership lets 
us play in the sandpit and then they arrive in fire engines, They do what they 
want and ride into the sunset." 
The role of labour leadership in giving strategiC direction to the negotia-
tions process as well as ensuring that the outcome of one process fits into 
labour's overall agenda is a critical one and should not be dismissed. 
However, this role should occur through a process of continual mandating 
and evaluation, not as a crisis intervention at the eleventh hour which 
serves to undermine labour'S front-line negotiators as well as to slow 
down the negotiation process, 
The lack of consultation and mandating between the different levels in 
NEDLAC and the affiliates has two implications. In the first instance, 
labour's negotiators are often compelled to negotiate' in a situation in 
which they are unsure of what the official mandated position is on the 
particular issue that they are negotiating. This insecurity can contribute to 
undermining the negotiating team as they may not be sure whether or not 
they have their organisation's backing on a particular issue. In this con-
text. the ability of labour's representatives to negotiate with confidence 
2 We could not confirm this as, despite repeated attempts, we were unable to obtain an 










































LAW,· DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT 
becomes contingent on their own standing and power within labour 
rather than following from the power of a mandated collective decision. 
This problem hasn't affected the functioning of all chambers. as some 
representatives are of a relatively senior standing within the labour 
movement, but the operation of some chambers has been slowed down 
as negotiators do not have the organisational power to access senior 
leadership for approval (interview: Naidoo). This results in labour's partici-
pation in NEDLAC resting on the veto power of a few senior leaders which 
undermines the essence of the democratic labour movement: that of 
collective and mandated positions. 
The criticism of the form that labour leadership's interventions take is 
not limited to the labour caucus, but is also expressed by the other con-
stituencies within NEDLAC. As one government representative stressed, 
"there is nothing wrong with leadership intervention especially if it is 
creative, innovative and has vision: (the problem) is the manner or the 
process of that intervention" (confidential interview: Government source). 
A consequence of this seemingly ad hoc process of intervention is the 
perception from other social partners that there is an "A-team" and a "B-
team" within labour. This perception is then translated into a desire to 
deal only with the "decision-makers" within labour. which undoubtedly 
militates against the image of labour as a collective agent. 
Thus, while the role of leadership is critical, it is essential that their in-
terventions take place in a way that is structured and therefore account-
able to a broader section of the labour movement. Generally speaking - as 
the recent history of the South African labour movement demonstrates 
organisational structures and processes are longer-lasting than the pres-
ence of key leaders. 
Secondly. lack of communication and consultation within labour slows 
down the rate at which NEDLAC can reach decisions, thereby making 
labour vulnerable to criticisms of preventing government from delivering 
reforms to the workplace. A response from a confidential labour source 
captures this situation: 
"The fact that there is not clear communication between labour in the different 
structures within NED LAC complicates issues, The result is that you find that an 
issue has been discussed comprehensively in the chamber, but when it goes to 
higher level structures you have to sell it from the beginning because senior 
level leadership knows nothing about it. So the lack of communication really 
slows down the decision making process," 
4.2.8 Difficulties of mobilisation 
A substantial part of labour's influence within the NEDLAC process is 
derived not only from the rights granted to it in the NEDLAC Act, but from 
its ability to mobilise members in support of a particular issue, Whilst it 
may be easy to mobilise members around the LRA or a 40-hour working 
week, both of which are deeply entrenched in the history of South African 
workers' struggle, the reality is that a considerable proportion of issues 
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representative in the Trade and Industry Chamber, captures this aspect of 
the NED LAC process: 
"The LRA has a history in South Africa, so in workers minds it is seen as an 
important issue, there were many historic struggles fought over the LRA and 
that is in people's minds. When you choose an issue to fight it has to be win-
nable and people are not going to go onto the streets for a social clause" 
(Gostner, 1997: 139-140). 
Undoubtedly, issues like the LRA and employment standards are close to 
the shopfloor and to workers' hearts and are therefore easy to mobilise 
around. However, these issues have also been the subject of a number of 
well orchestrated campaigns that have helped to place them high on 
workers' agendas. If information about NEDLAC negotiations is not being 
dispersed to union membership or even to union officials not directly 
involved in NEDLAC, it is difficult to imagine that any of these new issues 
will become sites of struggle to expand labour's rights through NEDLAC. 
The present lack of information dispersal in the federations was cap-
tured by one respondent who exclaimed, "You don't have a filter at the 
top of COSATU, you have a f------ plug" (confidential interview: Labour 
source). Another confidential source made the same point somewhat 
more subtly, "at the moment an issue gets plugged into COSATU and it 
gets stuck. That is the biggest capacity problem. You need mechanisms 
that facilitate participation". Although these quotations refer directly to 
COSATU, the other federations are also characterised by a Failure to 
disperse information within their structures. That said, NEDLAC is an ex-
tremely new institution and labour is beginning to show signs of adapting 
to the institution, as increasingly NEDLAC is a subject for discussion on the 
agendas of the executive committees of some of the affiliates. 
This failure to disperse information creates the potential for a situation 
in which labour will have progressively less influence over an increasing 
range of issues, as the issues tabled at NEDLAC become increasingly far 
from the power-base of the unions - the rank-and-file membership. Cam-
paigns are not simply the spontaneous outpouring of workers' objective 
interests but are events requiring a considerable amount of information 
dispersal and mobilisation. If labour is to maintain an influence over the 
policy process within NEDLAC it needs to address this problem. 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This article has explored the implications of the legislative rights, articu-
lated through NEDLAC, that labour has won as a consequence of its 
struggle to limit the state's control over policy-making. In addition we 
have explored the ways in which labour has used these rights within the 
context of the challenges posed by its engagement in a complex and 
ambitious institution. 
Labour's success in obtaining the legislated right that all proposed 
changes to labour legislation and economic and social policy have to be 
negotiated through NEDLAC has ensured that their role in policy-making is 
firmly entrenched. The NEDLAC Labour Caucus has managed to successfully 
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policy process as well as to stall government departments in their func-
tioning where the interests of labour were being undermined. thereby 
compelling government to make some sort of concession. As Jayendra 
Naidoo outlined. "Labour has already got a lot out of NEDLAC. such as the 
LRA. the details of changes to regulations. institutions and other minor 
actors. the ILO conventions. access to WTO. the Workplace Challenge ... 
the scale is a million times more than that which was achieved before" 
(interview: Naidoo). 
Notwithstanding labour's gains, our investigation has revealed a num-
ber of weaknesses in the nature of labour's engagement in NED LAC which 
raise a question mark over the efficacy of labour's involvement in negoti-
ated policy making. The question. put simply. is whether these weak-
nesses are due to the ambivalence which labour has about this new 
institutions, and indeed about the new government, or whether they have 
to do purely with capacity and leadership problems associated with a 
union movement that is struggling to develop the competencies necessary 
to engage with a wide range of technical issues. This is not a question 
which we have managed to answer conclusively through our research. 
That said, our interviews revealed a broad support for NEDLAC within 
labour. As such it may be possible to conclude that the problems facing 
labour have more to do with coming to grips with the complexity and 
scope of the demands of NEDLAC than an antagonism to or disinterest in 
the institution. 
However. labour has yet to develop a clear strategy of how to use NED-
LAC, what issues to bring to the table, what policy directions and strategic 
parameters must be agreed to up front, and which battles should be 
fought and why. The capacity and leadership problems are reflected in the 
host of problems identified in this article. including time constraints, skill 
shortages. and dysfunctional structures. There is no doubt. however. that 
if labour fails to develop a strategic response to and programme for its 
involvement in NEDLAC, then the capacity and leadership problems will 
simply grow. At present the failure to build up a team. appOint dedicated 
officials to NEDLAC and address capaCity issues, would seem to predict 
the pOSSibility of labour having an increasingly tenuous hold on the policy 
process. 
An unintended consequence of the lack of functioning structures is that 
information about NEDLAC negotiations is not forthcoming, which effec-
tively stalls the mobilisation of campaigns to put pressure on government 
and business within NEDLAC or to expand the rights won through NED-
LAC. Clearly, not all issues are "strikable". but the effective dispersal of 
information may form the basis for a creative campaign. For instance, 
consumer boycotts have a long and successful history in South Africa. In 
addition they have been used successfully by northern consumers to put 
pressure on multi-national companies to respect labour rights in their 
foreign subsidiaries. A well-organised consumer boycott of goods manu-
factured in countries that fail to respect labour rights would form a strong 
support of labour's pOSition in the Social Clause Framework Agreement. 
The lack of functioning structures also raises concerns about the extent 
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representative of the labour movement. This has raised the very serious 
possibility of the emergence of a small group of individuals who control 
labour's engagement in NEDLAC, instead of decision-making power being 
the responsibility of at least all those of the elected leadership and senior 
officials of those unions engaged in NEDLAC via the three federations, 
However, the formal framework of structures exists, so all that is required 
is that structures be used in a regular and consistent manner. This would 
ensure that labour's negotiators are aware of the official position and that 
position is broadly reflective of labour's interests. In addition, it would 
enable a wider range of activists to shape labour's engagement in NED-
LAC, thereby providing a larger pool of knowledge, skills and expertise for 
the negotiators to draw on. 
It is true that labour has made significant inroads into key areas of la-
bour market and trade and industry policy, making substantial gains for 
their membership. However, the modus operandi is generally one of 
reaction. Accordingly it is largely government's frame of reference that 
drives the NEDLAC process as well as setting the limits on what is possi-
ble. In certain instances labour has been able to make significant gains 
within that framework: however, it is not so clearly advancing a labour-
friendly approach to the formulation of policy. 
This is in part due to the approach of government to drafting policy in 
isolation from the social partners and then tabling it at NEDLAC as a fait 
accompli. Government's approach to policy formulation has also meant 
that NED LAC is drawn into the policy process after a considerable amount 
of development has taken place. This creates a situation in which consid-
erable time is spent in debating the policy basics once it gets to NEDLAC, 
in turn slowing down the process of implementation. If government were 
to develop a more consultative procedure for developing policy, it would 
allow the social partners the space to shape the framework within which 
policy is formulated as well as facilitate the process of consensus seeking. 
This may mean that NEDLAC becomes a site of formulating briefs for the 
development of policy rather than debating the final product. This may be 
a demand that the labour movement may wish to consider raising within 
NEDLAC. 
The credibility and effectiveness of institutions such as NEDLAC will be 
a product of stakeholder ownership of the outcomes. The first task must 
surely be to challenge and debate the "big picture issues". Here the pres-
entation of GEAR by government as a non-negotiable seriously under-
mines the principles and vision of NEDLAC. If the parties (and this 
includes government) are serious about seeking consensus in economic 
and social management, then the very essence of NEDLAC, both in prin-
ciple and in legislation, that all is negotiable needs to be affirmed. 
If labour is to optimise its utilisation of NEDLAC, it is essential that it 
devote time and resources to the development both of a comprehensive 
vision for South African society as well as the revival of structures to drive 
and struggle for that vision, both within NEDLAC and on the streets. 
Without such a strategic focus for NEDLAC as a whole and for the various 
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legislative programme or to arguing over the details. As one of our confi-
dential respondents noted: 
"Labour can't be careless: it must use NED LAC strategically. No other labour 
movement comes close to the influence labour can wield though NEDLAC, but 
if you use it badly it will swallow you up." 
The agenda for labour, then, is to develop the strategic focus to use effec-
tively the space it has won through NEDLAC. If it fails to do so, the prob-
lems of capacity and of leadership will not be addressed and labour will 
find itself reacting to government proposals and policy rather than signifi-
cantly shaping and influencing policy directions of the new government. 
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